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The behavioral sciences in conjunction with history provide a
unique opportunity for a more creative, yet precise, approach to the
‘ role of man as an historical and social agent. On the one hand his-
tory provides an approach to man ’ s role based on the appeal to both
facts and creative interpretation. On the other , the behavioral sci-
ences can provide historians with a more precise concept of the mech-
anism of social, cultural, and personal role development and action.
The creative conjunction of the behavioral sciences and history is
called Neo-synthecism in order to more easily identify this approach.
There are two purposes to this essay: to show both the general utility :
of a behavioral approach to history , and.the specific role. of the self-
fulfilling prophecy.
The self-fulfilling prophecy, derived from the work of sociolo-
gist , Robert K. Merton, demonstrates how men tend actively to fulfill
and objectify the expectations they hold for themselves. Thus men at-
tempt both consciously and unconsciously to f4lfill their own prophecies.
The data upon which this approach is based is primarily of an
interpretive nature. It briefly explores how individual scholars have
impl ,icitly assumed the idea of the self-fulfilling prophecy in the
course of their writing. Most historians unconsciously utilize the
concept without identifying or recognizing it as a specific behavioral
function of men, and their activities , in general. Further , the essay
invest.igates the idea of national character and social myth as factors
which the self-fulfilling prophecy both contributes to and is depend-
ent upon.
Neo-synthecism, while not a total explanation of the ’'why" of
history does help to account for som~ of its "mysteries." It can,
for instance, through the behavioral approach, help to explain the
role of the irrational as a causative historical factor. It also
helps to explain the mechanisms which prompt men to revolutionary
action. Thus it can penetrate the background of historical events
more fully. At the same time it provides the historian with a new
instrument for understanding the future as well as the past. That
is , in eχplaining one of the mechanisms whereby men control and mod-
ify events to suit their own beliefs , it enables historians to under-
standwhy particular expectations can or cannot be fulfilled. In
one sense then the historian looks back from the "future" into the
past and predicts the predominance of one historical event over another.
Neo-synthecism, however , is a theory based upon suspended judg-
ment. It holds its interpretation in abeyance of the future ’B ver-
dict and is instructed b퍼 events.
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{ CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
History can be made. It is not
necessary to receive it as mere
destiny.
Gunn~r Myrdal
We live ••• lives based upon se-
lected fictions. Our view of
reality is conditioned by our
position in space and time-not
by our personalities as we like
to think.
Lawrence Durrell
Ideas , not unlike good wines , need time not necessarily to mel-
low, but at least to age. The ideas presented herein may be "under-
aged" (or perhaps may have even IIgone sour ll !) but are no less important
。r deserving of attention or elaboration. While my particular approach
may.not bring to the subject the necessary intelligence of explication
and elaboration (this judgment I leave to the reader) something must be
said of these ideas to at least clear the field for future work.
My intention in this essay is to promote, in some small way, the
inter-utility of the behavioralrsciences with history and vice-versa.
In doing so , however ，~ do not propose to once again lead history t。
uncritical worship at the altars of science. George' Gaylord Simpson
has said that:
The present'chaotic stage of humanity is not , as some wishful-
ly maintain , caused by lack of faith but by· too much unreason-
ing faith within these boundaries where such faith should have
no place. J.
- ~'.:'-"21.~.::.:;...;‘’ ‘ ’---~← ←←~，，"， . .J …~--~ -...---
:'"I'
2It is in the n없ne of just such an attempt (i.e. the elimination
of unreasoning faith) that contemporary scholars have made giant
strides in the name of reason (or at least rationality). Unfortunately,
what many, butby n~ means all , have been guilty of is a kind of "un-
reasoned faith" in reason itself. The effect is ultimately not unlike
being one of the faithful of the religious variety. Both sometimes
forget that the basis of their respective views of reality rely on an
equally tenuous foundation of assumptions and pre-suppositions. Spe-
cifically, what "rational man" often neglects in his attempts at ’'de-
finition" is that corollary toreason in every man which is 낀aIled the
"irrational". It is , -in one sense , the concern of this essay to elab-
orate on just what the el양nent of the irrational has to do with histor-
ical process. But in another and deeper sense it is also to show the
relationship that exists both inadvertently and consciously bet찌een
historical process and man ’s ability to in some way shape his future.
At base what this means is that man is ultimately responsible with re-
gard to the individual and to the outcome of his society at large. It
must be stressed, therefore , that this essay is not an "end" in any
sense of the word. Qnone level it is a statement of purpose; on
another it is a statement of future intent.
Hopefully the behavioral sciences , and specifically sociology
and psychology , will offer a direction to the study of man that seems
for the most part unexamined. And while I have let the behavioral
sciences direct , I have not let them lead. History, being " ••• tempo-
’‘ 2rally removed in the occasion of its even~~I- cannot be dictated to.
Interpretation is , however , a different matter , and as I tend to think
3in terms of the historian, I have chosen my direction of interpretation
accordingly. Let it not be.disparaging of , or to , the behavioral
scientist. Each of us must choose.
In the following essay , ~ will be concerned not so much with his-
torical sequence as I will. be with the nature of particular interpre-
tations and their relative importance to my thesis. In the same manner
I will be less concerned with events than with what men have thought
뾰믿효 those events. ’ For it is not the intelligent understanding of our
past , in order to control the future , that must be the historian ’ s pri-
mary concern. More importantly it is with the knowledge of man's ca-
pacity , both to control and be controlled, tobe at once agent and
objective observer , and to realize that he can never step "outside" of
history ’ s ebb and flow. Ultimately this must be his foremost consid-
eration.
Because this essay is primarily concerned with the mechanism and
implications of the objectification of an historical and pehavioral
process , and not simply with facts per se , there is .not a concentration
。r emphasis on primary research. The very nature of the problem lends
itself more fully to interpretation and a certain amount of necessary
speculation. One must also know the problem before he can solve it.
r
~
CHAPTER II
THE VIEW ]’ROM THE FUTURE
Twentieth Century historians are perhaps the strangest breed of
scholars ever produced. They are caught in a dilemma of their own
making. For while it is fashionable to decry causation in history ,
all appear to be looking for meaning; and meaning is , after all. only
another word for the product of causal relationships. Certainly few
historians will admit to anything more than relating: "wie es eigent-
lich gewesen." But, while it may be in bad taste to raise the question
of causation in history, the "need" to find'meaning , to explain the
"why" of 'a particular event , remains as relevant as ever. Like death
and defecation , causality is rarely spoken of directly. I will not
only discuss and propose a theory of both direct and indirect causal-
ity in history, but also examine and 、·illustrate how other scholars ,
not only historians , have often unwittingly and/or without full aware-
ness of the forces involved, implicitly affirmed the existence of a
particular and verifiable historical theory.
This approa~h will hopefully be more than cursory and less than
r
comprehensive. It will, in the end, set the stage for a wider and
more embracing approach to the social sciences.through a broader un-
derstanding of a little known and little understood phenomenon derived
from the work of the sociologist Robert K. Merton. This phenomenon is
’.1the "self-fulfilling prophecy"- and it is to this we must first direct
our attention.
The "Thomas Theorem"
and
the Self-fulfilling Prophecy
Robert K. Merton , in his book Social Theory and Social Structure
raises , almost indirectly, a theory of social causation which in its
consequences extends far beyond the somewhat minor position that he
relegates it to. Taking the Thomas theorem {"If men define situations
2
as real , they are real in'their consequences") .... as his basis , Merton
eχpands the theorem into a definition of broad social action and reac-
tion. Merton points out , with regard to the Thomas theorem, that it:
••• provides an unceasing reminder that men respond not only t。
the objective features of a situation, but also , and at times
primarily , to the meaning this situation has for them. And
once they have assigned some meaning to the situation their
consequent behavior and some of the consequ~nces of that behav-
ior are determined by the ascribed mea~ini.3
How then does, this apply to "real" situations? Merton illus-
11 4trates the mechanism in a ’Sociological Parablell ."" He describes a
hypothetical banking failure and collapse in the early Thirties which
was due to an objectification of eXRectations. In the case of Merton ’g
"Last National Bank" example, the rumored insolvency of the bank be-
comes real insolvency when enough people believe the rumor to be true
and attempt to salvage their earnings. Merton explains the failure
thusly:
The stable financial structure of the bank had depended upon one
set of definitions of the situation: belief in the validity of
the interlocking system of economic promises men live by. Once
depositors had defined the situation otherwise , once they ques-
tioned the possibility of having these promises fulfill홈d ， the
consequences of this unreal situation were real enough. J
Merton goes on for nearly all of the remaining portion of his chapter
to expose the elemtns of the Thomas theorem as it ~pplies to the
6
racial problem ~n America. This latter example, important as it may
be , need not overly concern us at this juncture. What Merton says
e.n•‘a”--’t1,‘앓·냐없.ma빼s·I·Vtg’nn‘。rnr·뱀과.lZl‘파,핵
t
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important matter.
By way of further example let us "read out" the mechanism on a
more individual level , for ultimately it is individual action which
provides the "stuff of history." Let us assume that someone visits
a so-called '’fortune teller" and that during the ‘ course、 of the evening
the "seer" makes a prediction concerning events that are to transpire
on the following ‘ day, and that among those events the "seer'’ foretells
。f an accident which is to take place in that person ’s living room on
the next morning. In most instances the individual will shrug off this"
prediction as humorous , but irrelevant, fantasy. In this case , however ,
the next morning, while nailing a picture to the wall , the individual
falls off the stool he was on thus fulfilling the "fortune teller ’s It
prophecy, albeit perhaps subconsciously. As Merton points out: "The
self-fulfilling prophecy is , in the 、‘beginning， a 로략똥 definition of
the situation evoking a new behavior which makes the originally false
6
conception come 호프프트."- Thus , in our example, despite the individual's
scoffing at the seer ’ s prediction as false , it has none-the-less evoked
a new series of behavioral reactions which have caused the essentially
false prediction to "come true.": that is to say, the individual in-
sures and produces hisown accident. Merton continues , concerning
such behavior, to say that: "The specious validity of the self-fulfill-
ing prophecy perpetuates a reign of 빼error. For the prophet will cite
the actual course of events as proof that he was right from the very
beginning. _t7
7But need the validity of the self-fulfilling prophecy be specious
in all circumstances? Or , are there , after all , circumstances in which
the self-fulfilling prophecy leads to situations that are valid in them-
selves with regard to the predictions made aBout them? Can a people, a
nation , or an entire civilization guide the course of its own destiny
over the entire range of"possible futures? These questions form the
framework of what is to follow and act as arrows pointing in new direc-
tions of investigation. What then can we say of these questions?
r
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CHAPTER III
PATTERNS
I have chosen to call' the objectification of the self-fulfilling
prophecy in history "Neo-synthecism." My purpose in referring to the
objectification of the self-fulfilling prophecy as "snyth랴ic" is to
present the role of the behavioral sciences (e.g. psychology and
sociology) in a union with historical method.
Thus , the theory presented l1ere is "synthetic" in that it is a
partial synthesis of those several disciplines. The prefix "Neo-"
has been affixed in order to avoid (hopefully) any connotation of
the Hegelian "dialetic": that is , to prevent the mistake of view-
ing this theory as a synthesis derived from a "thesis" and an "anti-
thesis"; also , simply because it is a "new" theory of social and
cultural causation.
Neo-synthecism is a theory of history based upon suspended judg-
ment. Because the art and science of written history depends~ no matter
what the nature of causation may be , upon interpretation and creativity,
as well as upon documentation and the appeal to facts , Neo-synthecism,
as every true history must , holds its truths in abeyance of the future ’ g
interpretive verdict~
Whereas a total theory of history would attempt to perhaps "read"
from the future , as well as fram the past, the Neo-synthetic theory
makes no pretentions to that effect. 'With the contemporary state of
9the' art , being what it i~ ， such an attempt would likely be futile. As
the role of the historian broadens , however , such endeavors may even-
tually prove modestly successful. With computer aids , the several
·펴’n행야m
‘
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tory" , and most importantly , an identification of the role of the
self-fulfilling prophecy, certain future historical trends could be
more effectively charted than ispresently possible.
The question of future trends should at least be raised here , if
not answered. (This problem will be dealt with, at least partially,
in the final section.) What this attempt becomes , therefore , is one
of exploration ,of the currents of historical process themselves. While
not disregarding whatever "ends" history holds , neither does it become
bound by them. Stated simply , Neo-synthecism is a theory of ongoing
process and not of'final or teleological ends.
Studies in the Self-fulfilling Prophecy
As has been noted, Neo-synthecism is a theory based upon suspended
judgment. It is still, however , a gauge for social and cultural ambi-
tions , hopes , and fears. Until the Renaissance , the idea of progress
had been of relatively minor importance. The 16th and 17th centuries
mark for the first, time in human history the explicit idea of earthly
pr。gresg.l It is aIso in the 17th cent1lry that the idea of ”rev。1u-r
2tion" in the political sense was derived.- Revolution hinges on the
idea of progress. For without the hope of human betterment , there
could be no projection of the aspirations of worldly political, social,
and cultural improvement. The concept of revolution is , in' fact , an
一--~...-.. ~γ7
10
explicit recognition of the idea that a man's thoughts and ideals must
lie in the future to be relevant to the present. Miguel Unamuno , the
Spanish philosopher has{said that , ”Every。ne who fights f。r any ideal
whatever , although his ideal may seem to lie‘ in the past, is driving
".3the world on to the future. ,, ·J This generation of ideals , their pro-
jection, or "drive to the future ," is the concretization of the· self-
fulfilling prophecy. Thus , every true revolutionary utilizes the con-
cept. While it is tempting to investigate the very obvious connections
with Marxist revolutionary thought , I will touch only peripherally
upon the subject·as I primarily wish to concentrate on American his-
tory. (See appendix.)
Most instances of the self-fulfilling prophecy in history and
in historical interpretation occur.in such'a manner as to be almost
invisible , due to the obviousness of their operation. The American
revolution , for instance, can be seen as a reaction, in terms of an
economic and socio-ideological outlook, in which the vision of the
future modified and directed the outcome. The colonials , prior to
the early middle 1760 ’s , for example, looked upon themselves:almost
exclusively as part and parcel of the British Empire. Expectations
reflected in colonial literature prior to 1763 would seem to indicate
that Americans considered themselves British in the full sense of the
word. 4 The end of the French and Indian wars in 1763 and the resump-
tion of Great Britain's attempt to reimpose its full supremacy over
the colonies , modified colonial attitudes to the extent that the
mother country became the symbol of repression rather than of toler-
ance and order. A case can certainly be madefor the assumption that
11
most colonials eχpected， at least until the mid-seventies , that America
would remain in, and contribute to , Britain ’s "course of Empire." In-
deed, it w。uld seem thatlmany col。niaIs believed that America was only
Britain outre-mer. However , when the full extent of British economic
and political attitudes became known (or rather felt!) the colonials
began to modify .their views of the future. The seeds of the Constitu-
tion of 1787 were thus , in no small degree , sown in 1763. In its 따1-
phases on the written assurance of such things as no bills of attainder ,
no ex post fact。 legislation and the guarantee of habeas corpus , the
constitution would be the embodiment of the break from England. No
longer would Americans look upon Britain as mentor , but as suppressor.
Events which ,shaped and directed Colonial resistance , such as
the Boston Massacre were, in and of themselves , a reaction.which con-
stituted what the colonists· wished the situation to be , rather than
what was actually the case. The grievances listed by Thomas Jefferson
in the Declaration of Independence, and directed against George III ,
in their intellectually emotional and almost literary. style are not ,
in a strict sense , real appeals to wrongs committed against the co-
10따a1s.5 More properly they are ”projected” wrongs and affr。ntS 뿔
seen by the colonials. Whether George III, for instance , could in
reality be accused (as Jefferson did) ofi.having as his" ••• direct ob-
ject the establishment of an absLlute tyranny 。ver i헐er펠7 .,,6 is
certainly moot.
Whether on앙 regards the Revolution as an economic phenomenon
or as an intellectual movement based upon "natural law,’I the fact
remains that without a projection of possibilities into the future ,
r ,
/
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，~ithout some very real expectations as to what the future was to be
made to hold, and without a prophetic sense (or, if you will , mission)
the revolution could not have taken place. John Adams argued, for ex-
ample , that:
The prospect now before us in America, ought ••• to engage the
attention of every man of learning, to matters of power and
right , that we may beneither led nor driven blindfolded to
irretrievable destruction. Nothing less than this seems to
have been meditated for us , by somebody or other in Great
Britain. There see~ to be a_direct and formal design on
foot , to enslave all America. 7
Thomas Paine also reflected this same sense of the future. Con-
sider the following: "It is repugnant to reason, to the universal or-
der of things , to all ex없~les from former ages , to suppose, that this
continent can' longer remain subject to any external power. 8
Here is the writ ,ing of a man who not only has a "prophetic" sense
。f history, but iS'resolved that his view shall come to pass.
Once the co~itment had been made to the basic cause of independ-
ence, the range of future horizons could be broadened widely: the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights are the tangible results of that
extended horizon. These two fQrmative documents are ostensibly based
upon principles of liberty andequality for all men. The preamble,
for example, speaks in terms of ''We the People ••• ," implying an exten-
sion of freedom to more than just a single cross-section of the popula-
tion. The Bill of Rights too mentions specifically (Articles I , II ,
and IV). "The right of the poeple"; not simply a specific social or
political group, but again ”the pe。ple” ·9
In one sense, however , the abolitionist movement , the Civil War ,
the integration movements from Little Rock to the present, and the
...,.a..
Civil Rights Acts of the 1960 ’ s , are all att윈npts to fulfill the·es-
sential quality of prophecy embodied in the Constitution and Bill of
Rights.
I
In 1943, Gunnar Myrdal , in his classic 6tudy An American Dilemma
noted the prophetic and unfulfilled ideals of these two basic American
13
doctnnents. Myrdal pointed to what he called "the American Creed" (i.e.
of the Constitution and Bill of Rights) and noted that as an ideal of
social , political, and moral conduct , white (and black) 、Americans held
a.set of values which professed equality, but promoted a fairly rigid
state of inequality. Myrdal, in an unfortunately abbreviated manner ,
offered, as a solution to the racial problem, an intensification of
the American Creed. The study showed quite clearly that the conditions
10
of 'our Constitution and Bill of Rights were.unfulfilled.
There is , of cours양’ the obvious criticism to this line of rea-
soning that the. founding fathers were both speaking and writing rhetor-
ically. The argument states that the authors of the Constitution and
th~ Bill of Rights had no real intention of ever extending the freedoms
enumerated in these documents to large sections of the population, es-
pecially the black slave and non-property holding poor white. In ef-
feet the "natural law" which was deemed universal was so only to a
fair1y small , propertied, whitF male cross section 。f hmanity. Uni-
versal "self-evident" truths , which men such as Thomas Jefferson and
James Madison espoused, were to be limited, inreality, to a select
"quasi-aristocracy" and middling class. Thus the proponents of this
line of reasoning would point to the electoral.college as an ex없nple
。f what the founding fathers truly had in mind. In this regard , the
14
argument continues , they were motivated not by the extension of liber-
ty to all men , or even to all Americans , but rather by "enlightened self-
interest." This 'position has much to reconunend it , and may come close
to the truth of the matter. The validity of the argument is , however ,
relatively unimportant with regard to the considerations being studied
here. The important thing·to note is the effect that the rhetoric , true
。r false , has had upon the American imagination.
If the founding fathers had no intention of extending liberty to
효표 men, certainly succeeding generations of Americans at least have
begun to do so. In part , the middle-class quest for security has prompted
the fulfillment of the prophecy of the rhetoric of the Constitution and
Bill of Rights. Impelled by fear of minority violence , which also rep-
resents a challenge to middle class supremacy, the middle-class has sought
to extend the dominance of their position by incorporating other minorities
into the political, economic , and social infrastructure they have built.
The effort has thus been to submerge minority groups and dissenters by
extending and projecting the rhetoric ρf freedom into reality. Consti-
tutional rhetoric thus becomes a prophecy to be fulfilled , whether or
not it "(V'8S originally intendedto be such.
The intriguing problem for the historian becomes one of affixing
a point in time when thig rhetOFic shifted into an attempt to live up
to the challenge of its implications. One argument along these lines
suggests that the threat of Fascism and Communism have presented Amer-
11icans with 8 need to live up to the challenge of American rhetoric.
Taken at face value this means only that certain conditions of
the American philosophy need to be intensified and promoted. But the
15
language of the Preamble , which explains the general aims of the Consti-
tution , exhibits an attitude of '’mission. 1I It points to the future , to
,12
••• "our posterity ••• ’ and explains what can be expected in the eχten-
sion of freedom to Americans under the protective aura of its enumera-
tions. It is a prescription for the future , a contract with destiny ,
the terms of which are now finally forcing Americans to account. That
we have not lived up to the terms of our basic Republican documents is
obvious. There has been, as noted above , a tradition of American liber-
alisrn which has recognized this all along. It is this element in our
society which has frequently attempted to rectify the inequalities
generated by the traditionally individualistic white American. Demo-
cratic consent in America is an experiment unfulfilled. It has been,
and remains , a picture of the future , a prediction which is based
upon the Constitution and Bill of Rights; its principles and methods
original1y , formulated by men such as James Madison, and refined further
by Constitutional amendments over the last century and a half. The
Constitution, a complex social charter which set up the political 없ld
legal limits of society, defended and promoted a particular view of
the future. The Bill of Rights extended that view by insuring that
certain individual 없ld social prerogatives would remain inviolate.
But the Revolution and ~ts attendant view of the future are only
one aspect of the operation of Neo-synthecism. The above discussion
only points in a direction: it shows very basically how Neo-synthecism
can be used as a tool for interpretation and understanding of the past;
eventually we will come to see the possibilities for interpreting the
future as history. Consideration must first be given tosome further
16
basic attributes of ~eo-synthecism.
Rightly or wrongly, intellectual historians tend to look upon
history as an act of cognitive involvement; one in which ideas tend
to prevail over mere activity. Certainly this is at least in part
true. Neo-synthecism is , to a great extent , the verification of this
idea. On the one hand it accounts for human cognition in terms of di-
rected activity; on the other hand , it does not deny economic , psycho-
sexual, religious (or whatever) theories of historical causation. It
merely places them within the context of the self-fulfilling prophecy.
This , however , raises a pertinent question: is the self-fulfilling
prophecy , in historical situations , only one aspect of a larger subject
and , if so , what may that subject be? Or is it a larger subject in it-
self, of which other, hitherto unrelated "f,ields-in-themselves" are
but a part? That it should be introduced by the sociologist , Robert
Merton , is , in itself I think, significant. Considering the probability
of unconscious motivation it would seem mαre properly within the realm
of the psychologist. Yet we find t~e major , definitive work done in a
sociological context. At this particular juncture I wish to .only raise
the point-- not explain it. There is reason, however , to raise the
question of the psychologist ’s involvement , as well as that of the
sociologist and historian, in (the e1Florati。n 。:E this important but
neglected subject.
It seems almost inconceivable , on reflection, that human exis-
tence could be considered "in toto’I without benefit of an adequate
understanding of the operation of the self-fulfilling prophecy. Per-
haps the closest, and only, approach outside of Merton to the idea
comes from Existential philosophy. Sartre ’s "project," for example ,
(i.e. conscious commitment to a course of action) probably touches
more than Sartre himself realized, in his discussions on psychology ,
13the deepest elements of human culture and civilization.
17
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Further the concept of the self-fulfilling prophecy is , in part ,
dependent on whether or not it is possible to determine a ’'national
character ," or at least leaders of a certain viewpoint. David M.
Potter in his book People of Plenty raises and explores 、'the ques tion
。f the American national character. At the same time Potter makes
some implicit assumptions concerning the self-fulfilling prophecy
which are helpful in understanding Neo-synthecism.
Potter points out that, " ...national character is a changing
and not a fiχed quality, for culture itself.changes"; and culture,
14
" ••• acting upon and shaping the personality ••• " is the determinant.
Potter derives th i.s conclusion from a study of the work of several
social psychologists , sociologists , and anthropologists. He describes
how they have investigated the natio~al character , showing the rela-
tive rather than the absolute nature of character which is none-the-
15less a real and , verifiable quality.
Derivation of national character , then, is a composite of many
different approache~， all of 밴ich Potter attempts to unify 따thin an
historical context. But what is , the national American character?
16
Basically it is a ,commitment to a utilization of economic abundance.
As a result of this commitment many things make themselves apparent:
individualism, consumer orientation, and some of the persisting social
ills. Potter ’ s views concerning thenature of the American character
18
need not be our major concern here. But it is important that Potter
feels it possible to definenationa1 character; that it is not a static
quality; and , finally , that he has come to grips with the problem in a
way which precludes any mystical qualifications. But Potter ’ s reliance
is not on a simple subjective and unverifiable personal basis. He qual-
ifies his observations in terms of the important work done along the
same lines in the behavioral sciences:
The behavioral sciences attach importance to the individual ’ s
image of himself , and the group ’s image of itself , as forces
in the formation of character , for the individual or the group
will tend to be in fact what they imagine themselves to be in
fancy.17
Potter thus recognizes and attaches no little importance to this version
of the self-fulfilling prophecy. Throughout his work there remains an
implicit , if not at times explicit assumptio~ that men can shape their
future if they are aware of the nature of their goals. Certainly,
Potter has opened up the concept of national character to more critical
study. Too , he provides us with some of the first valid studies of an
extremely difficult problem.
The self-fu~filling prophecy does not in an historical context ,
however , mean that only one view of the future isrequired or necessary;
in fact , often many prophecies may be made over an extended period of
time , and as the terms of one , or several , prophecies are fulfilled ,
others take their place. Examples abound in American history. For our
purposes , however , we will first examine , in limited detail , Albert K.
1 Weinberg ’s Manifest Destiny, a study of nationalist expansionism in
18American history.
The philosophy of manifest destiny as Weinberg defines it is
19
" ••• the doctrine that one nation has a preeminent social worth, a dis-
tinctively lofty mission, and consequently unique rights in the applica-
,,19
tion of moral principles. ’ Weinberg ’s entire effort is directed at
t
showing hos this conception of America ’s rol~ in the world has shaped
its attitudes toward itself as well as its neighbors.
Manifest destiny was in vogue long before the term itself met
with public approval , and was coined by John L. O'Sullivan in 1845 in
20justification of the acquisition of the Oregon territories.-~ Weinberg
describes in detail the many justificatory arguments used to promote
expansion, such as Natural Right , Geographical Predestination, the
Destined Use of the , Soil, Natural Growth, the Extension of Freedom,
the White Man's Burden, the Mission of Regeneration, Political Gravi-
tation, Inevitable Destiny, Paramount Inter~st， Political Affinity,
Self Defense, International Police Power , and World Leadership. He il-
lustrates graphically how the contents of manifest destiny have remained
consistently the same while the labels and rhetoric have shifted. An
analysis of two of Weinberg ’ s chapteFs will suffice to show his method.
By the 1840 ’s manifest destiny had become a by-word in American
life. The idea of expansion over the limits of the entire continent
21
was widespread.-- The scope of expansion, however , was not as impor-
tant as the assumed superiority of American institutions. ·More than
anything, the idea of freedom seemed to most Americans manifestly des-
22
tined to spread its benefits across the continent. Weinberg dis-
cusses why the idea had not occurred (as one would assume it should
have) before this period. Basically the acquisition of the territory
did not initially seem n~cessary. Although, as Federalist paper
• - • ~‘ ••~_..---~ ..-
"'"'
.,.,.,.
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number nine points out , size assures a certain immunity to faction , the
area held in mind was only the original 13 states. Another widely held
’'reason" against expansion previous to the Forties was that it would
"endanger the rights 때 liberites of현o관l ‘ir파vidual states"; and
23individual citizens.-- Fear rather than altruism seems to have initial-
ly postponed expansion and prevented such consideration until these fears
were dissipated or allayed by the Thirties. Democracy was at last seen
24
as fitting fully into the context of a large geographical area. None
of these effects , however , reasons Weinberg , were enough to explain the
outburst of expansionism in the Forties. The cause ultimately lay in
a , " ...defensive effort to forestall the encroachment of Europe in North
,,25 ",'1.- •• _ t
er 1.ca. ’ Thus "extension of the area of ’ freedom ’ was the defiant
,:-:....... :::-, 1 ... '1..._ ... 1..... .: ..._ 1 ,,26answer to the extension 0택r .Europea.n I 'abso.1utism. 1 "LQ Weinberg goes
.-.-.-.. _.
。n to point out that , significantly, although the United States feared
European encroachment , that encroachment was itself caused by a Euro-
27pean fear of the growing political and economic power of the Americans.
This fear of growing American power ，~ and the resulting "encroachment ,"
explains why the United States had not , previous to 1840, been as con-
cerned with the generation of absolutism from those quarters.
Three principle grounds are indicated by Weinberg for the American
fear of the European menace to her democracy. First , the belief that
a direct threat to her security carried with it a direct threat t。
her political principles. Second, that European absolutism would
"pollute" American democracy by its very contiguity. And third and
perhaps most influential, that adjacent European expansion would threat-
28
en the extension of American democracy........ The direct"menace" lay in
Texas and Oregon. The , Union 함as now seen as imperiled by the failure
to annex Texas; too , expansion wasseen as a guarantee of states and
individuals ’ rights , and a guarantee against the centralization of
29
federal power. Strangely, as Weinberg indicates , protection was n。‘W
felt necessary, in certain quarters , against the their own Federal gov"
.30ernment~~ ~ Added to these indications were the positive values of
individualism through a now espoused pioneering spirit. Thus was born
an irresistible march of settlers who believed themselves' to be spread-
ing the idea of freedom as they went. The propagation of freedom had
31become nationalized.
Amazingly, the fact that , the Texas government was already Repub-
lican was either ignored or by-passed in arguments for annexation due
32
to the very nature of "nationalized American, freedom."-- "Impatience"
with other men who did not understand the benefits of American freedom
33
moved Americans to exert an example by "pedagogical" methods. It was
now put to the American pioneer to go into adjacent areas and spread
the idea of American freedom by direc~ word and action.
Once more , however , directions shifted and the peoples of other
non-American nations in our hemisphere , such as Mexico , Republican
though they may have been, ~ere seen as bearing the shackles of oppres-
sion and needful of the benefits of American freedom. While this a1-
truism was at least partially felt , the emphasis lay actually on the
extension of freedom to, and for , basically white Americans only.
Weinberg comments that an incongruous belief had crept into the Amer-
ican philosophy of democracy: ~ " ••• the belief that , however equal men
..34
might be at birth, Americans had become subsequently a super-people."
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And further , that: " ••• the ’Forties witnessed the full flowering of
national self-esteem in consequence of the undeniable promise in Amer-
ican life , of intensi~ie~ democratic self-co떠ciousness， of heightened
nationalism, and of the partial stupidity of ‘ national adolescence. ’.35
The quality of moral ambition and a national d。맑1a of quasi-heavenly
。rdained mission were essentially combined. The American concept was
a combination of "Calvinist pride and equalitarianism" which saw not
36the meek , but the free inheriting the earth.
A second major area of concern for Weinberg is his chapter en-
titled "Political Gravitation" which moves from the quasi-moral and
ideological themes , of the ·Thirties and Forties into the quasi-
scientific and political motives of the Fifties , Sixties , and Seven-
ties.
The new concept of expansion which captured the American mind
was based on a notion of physics which sanctioned expansion as an
。c~urrertce derived out of the laws of the natural world of inanimate
objects and projected into the human political world. Thus the con-
elusion was dr~wn， 1I ••• that adjacent nations within the range of Amer-
ica ’ s attraction would fall to the Union by a process as inevitable
37
a.s that causing the ripe apple to fall to earth. II-· This curious
doctrine carried with it m。잭 expectations and "more exalted moral
38
sentiment ••• " than any doctrine of expansion in American history.
Weinberg traces the genealogy of Newtonian physics from its applica-
tion in the sphere of social behavior during the French and American
revolutions (where incidentally, in the latter case it was used as
a justificatory argument) , into international relations , the early
22
Canadian annexation schemes , and do따1 to the Cuban "problem" of the
middle and late 1850 ’s. It was during the Cuban affair' that the term
"political gravitation" first Came into 찌ide American usage. 39
Why the concept came to fruition only after the Civil War , how-
ever , is probably due , as Weinberg comments , to: " ••• the fertile soil
supplied in America itself'by the needs which unconsciously form the
‘ nationalist ’s pragmatic criterion of .truth. ,,40 This "fertile soil"
lay in the intense anti-imperialism of certain Republican、 Ie용ders ， due
41itself in part to a certain war weariness. Furthermore , idealism,
emotional nationalism, and strategic, political, and commercial inter-
ests , all "allied" in a somewhat shaky fashion to promote the idea of
"political gravitation". This "political Newtonianism1l had several
coro~laries. First , that an 1I ••• ana1ysis of.many of the predictions
of the believers in political gravitation reveals ••• the explicit or
of 42implicit assumption of a geographical law'’.~- Thus , adjacent islands
such as Cuba and the West Indies were seen as geographically destined
to "fall" into the waiting arms of Ame.rica. This in turn was due to
the proximity of a large country to a small one. Still another corol-
,,43lary was the "economico-political law of gravitation."-'-'" Thu훌 econom-
ic considerations had found their way into the political sphere. For,
it was reas。ned， a comtry econ?micalIy dependent up。n anothar (as the
West Indies , Cuba, and Hawaii were seen to be upon the United States)
would be politically drawn into the former's political life. This
theory , however , soon applied not only to islands , but also to any
44contiguous territory. <.H, Weinberg goes on to illustrate how the doc-
trine was used in justifying the acquisition of Alaska (a neat feat of
23
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reasoning in itself , considering it was purchased by Secretary of State
Seward, and not taken by right!) and for the addition of other terri-
tories- But , significantly, when ”apples ’· such as the Dominican Repub-
lic and Denmark ’s Carribean possessions were offered the United States ,
the"law" failed to operate. Weinberg explains this anomaly by the
still fresh concern for the problems raised by the Civil War in the
late Sixties and ear.ly Seventies. Ardent nationalists such as Senator
William M. Stewart and Representative Henry R. Gibson exP lained this
condition by projecting the real test of the doctrine into the distant
45future.·- Weinberg also attributes its lack of success to a mistaken
political assumption of the transferability by analogy. of "natural
law" into human events. Thus two levels of phenomena were discussed
as if they were on one level. Further , perhaps one of the most impor-
tant reasons for failure , outside of the simple fact of the expansion-
ists being in the minority, was , I' ••• the attitude of lesser nationali-
’ ties towardthe greater." For eχample， the relationship between Spain
and its revolting Latin-American colonies , and to "El Colosso'’ (the
. _ 46United States) to the North.·- Americans , strong in nationalism failed
to recognize the strength of nationalism in other peoples of other na-
tions. In contradiction to the implied policy of "non-action" that
underlay the theory of politi~al gravitation, certain incidents tended
tO , reveal a very active policy. Among the many direct actions , the
American interference in Dominican affairs during the Grand administra-
tion, marks the high1p。int of such activity. The ultimate failure 。￡ the
non-interventionist annexation policy, characterized by political gravi-
tation , lveinberg concludes , was due to: " ••• the aggressive spirit of
.-• ...‘--~~. •
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manifest destiny itself. • • L표] disposed American ’ s very little to
that patient self-possession which was regarded by the stoics as the
.47true lesson of cosmic processes for men. ’
Now that we have seen, to some extent , Weinberg ’s method in the
preceeding examples we must resolve the extent to which the Neo-synthet-
ic theory is applied, and implied, in his study. In itself, the work is
an eχercise in the process of the unfolding of the self-fulfilling proph-
ecy in American history. Taking Weinberg ’ s definition of 、"manifest des-
tiny as a "jumping'off" point will help to illustrate some very basic
aspects of his implicit and unspoken assumption of the workings of the
self-fulfilling prophecy. Recalling that his definition o£ manifest
destiny was , "... the doctrine that one nation has a preeminent social
worth , a distinctively lofty mission, 없ld consequently unique rights
..48in the application of moral principles;’ it can be seen that there is
a philosophy , or concept , of nationhood which is defined in terms of
mission, purpose, and rights. The implications of this definition lie
on two levels: first , it is an histo~ian’ s concept of how a particular
people viewed themselves; second, it is not only a definition, but a
reality of outlook. That is , it not only relates to an historian ’s viev7
of a particular people, but also to their· own view of themselves. In the
latter sense it is a definition‘ concerning a society and its role with
regard to itself and its relation to the world around it. But exactly
to what extent can it be taken as a valid definition? Certainly, insofar
as we know at present , the Deity did not come to earth and voice to some
American Moses his projected role for the future of this country. It is
also evident that Americans perceived that they alone defined their social
26
worth. Nor can it be said that any unique rights were given Americans
by God or world opinion. The definitions of America ’ s role , her rights ,
destiny , mission, and social worth , were determined by her own citizens.
'~hatever the method of argument utilized, the‘ fact remains that a de£ini-
tion of a problem, role , idea, or whatever , hinges on a prediction made
in conjunction with that definition. The function of any such defini-
tion is thus to provide a basis of commitment to a concept of action.49
In doing so, it is 뇨nportant to note that the logic involved in
the fulfillment of a prophecy (which is what we shall see such a defi-
nition turn out to be) is not as important as the initial prediction
itself. Weinberg’ s arguments , for example those concerning "objective
and subjective determinism," implicitly make just such an assmnption
50
concerning the role of the irrational. JV In fact , the bases for his
entire study of manifest destiny are founded upon this groundwork.
Merton's concept of the self-fulfilling prophecy rests on the
idea that , 뇨i~ the beginning L표 펀 a縮 definition of a situa-
tion evoking a new behavior which ma~es theoriginally false conception
.51
come 프묘료."...... Manifest·destiny, as Weinberg has illustrated ,it , is a
/→、
--'
reflection of Merton's I ’false definition" being made to come true.
Consider the separate views of the United States and Great Britain
with regard to each other in the 1830 ’s and 1840 ’s over the issues of
Texas and Oregon territories. The expansionist·movements of the]’。rties，
Weinberg has shown, were generated by a growing fear of European en-
croachment 호n North America, a fear of the "polluting" influences of
Old World absolutism. On the other hand British encroachment was itself,
Weinberg contends , caused by a similar fear by Britain of the growing
political and economic power of the United States. What happened in
this case was that the definitions of political , economic , and military
motiveg generated 。n each party ’s respective side, evoked new behavior
on either ’ s part.This in turn justified and validated what was origi-
nally, at least in part , a farse belief, thereby evoking further , new
52behavior.~- Thus we see the perpetuation of Merton ’s "reign of ter-
‘ _53
ror."
As Weinberg points out , there is often a difference、 between the
attribution and the reality of a cause. For instance there is the
problem of whether manifest destiny was directly "caused" by sectional
interest (e.g. slaveholders) or whether it found its raison d ’etre in
54
an emotional idealism. Therefore, it is necessary to distinguish
in all cases the necessary and the sufficient, and to determine what
may be considered "relevant cause" from what is an irrelevancy.
The grounds for American fear of European encroachment , in them-
selves , were not , in the full sense of the word, "real" threats. Rath-
er they were the expression of 뼈erican fears for what 으으묘화 become the
case. Belief that a direct threat to security carried with it a direct
threat to political principles may have been well founded. But we have
seen that the generation of fears on either side was due to a mutual
and reciprocating sense of suspicion.. There was , in other words , a
feedback effect in which an initial fear generated its opposite , which
27
again in turn reinforced the initial suspicion, and so on, ad infinitum.
Certain elements of this primary fear , however, broke away to form their
own manner of vicious circularity. Fearof "political pollution'’, and
the threatened curtailing of the extension of American democracy became
28
generators on their own behalf. We see here a kind of double-sided ef-
feet of the basic Thomas theorem. Whether or not the suspected fear of
Britain was true or not , American's defined the situation as real. The
same was also true on Britain ’ s part. Both situations were defined sit-
uations. Both became emin~ntly real in their consequences. There is ,
then , a point at which theattribution of a cause , and the reality of a
cause become enmeshed and inseparable. Rhetoric , as a guage of section-
a1 interest, for instance was swept up in its own emotional verbage and
became, as in the case of Constitutional rhetoric , at once cause and
effect. Prophecies generated out of fear , however , are not positive
pictures of the future. They present a view of the failure which pro-
jects unhappy consequences and conditions. We have seen how Weinberg
portrayed the dire consequences predicted by ~dvocating the anneχation
。f Texas. They very structure and cohesiveness of the Union was seen
l as imperiled by a failure to act in time on the Texas' issue. Fear over
a loss of individual 없ld states rights was another aid to those prophe-
sizing doom. But what is the real me~ning of this kind of prophecy of
doom? Essentially, as a careful reading of Weinberg illustrates , such
predictions are antithetic images of the future , projected in the attempt
to realize a conscious , or·.unconscious , wished-for "true" image. In-
stances abound of this negative form of the self-fulfilling prophecy.
It is , in fact , a fairly common form of 20th century "right" and "left"
wing political technique. The John Birch Society, in its efforts to
"alert" the American people to the menace of internal Communist subver-
sion, continually portrays a fut.ure America cowed by its enemies , its
ideals perverted, and its people enslaved and degraded. All this effort
29
is , of course , not directed at fulfilling this prophecy , but at insuring.
its antithetic image.
The Left wirig (as well as in some cases the center political group-
55ings) projects·a similar gloomy picture, but ‘from a different viewpoint.
It tends to view a future of fascist dehumanization with an attendant
loss of personal liberty. In any case, the attempt is always much the
S휠ne: as in a photographic process a negative picture is projected in
order to insure a positive result.
If this line of reasoning is pursued the question will eventually
rise as to why anyone view of the future is able to predominate over
another. By what process , for example, did a national self-conscious-
ness allow a doctrine such as political gravitation to be given societal
sanction? Generally speaking, the self-fulfilling prophecy cannot contra-
diet basic values held by a particular society. F’。r instance , Represent-
ative William E. Robinson’ s confidence , in believing that , "... the time
..56
will come when Ireland will be annexed to this country,"- .... never came
to pass. In addition to the strategic dangers involved in Robinson ’s
statement , traditional American affinity for Britain may have precluded
any fulfillment of his prophecy.
Interpretation in terms of the Neo-synthetic theory depends on
the degree to which we are able, and 효훌프료료 that historians are in some
sense able , to evaluate and embrace the thought and spirit , that is the
climate of opinion of another age. The applicability of this generali-
zation, indeed of any historical generalization, demands a certain faith.
'~einberg assumes just such a faith in te깐ns of national character when
he discusses such subjects as "America ’s consciousness of national des-
--.-'- ι -~→ -←=-.:::.....:...，:，..;.;.~특~•.;::.;‘j;:::;;=-':"';~←→
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•• 57 ~ "' . . _ _ . _.58tiny" and, ". . . . :the assumed superiority of American institutions."
There is of course the problem of the masses and leadership: are indi-
viduals (presidents , senators , and other public officials) responsible
for national opinion; or are the voting masses~ responsible1 Without
attempting to oversimplify a difficult question, the answer probably
lies somewhere in between.· For while national leaders are responsible
for foreign and domestic policy , public opinion may provide at least some
impetus to the formation of such policy. The relationship is likely one
。f a dual reciprocity, heavily weighted on the side of the "elected rep-
resenatives.". What we call the "state" in the American sense, is sup-
posedly a balance between authority and total liberty (i.e. , anarchy).
Weinberg and most American historians agree that the "state" is a viable
political entity which is responsible for th~ decisions it makes. Wein-
berg ’ s discussion of political gravitation is , as it rightly should be ,
almost entirely in terms of individual statesmen and the "state" itself.
While public attitudes may shape policy, ". . .. the State. • .never-
,,59 '"'- ._. _~theless advances through history by ~eans of decisions. ’ The crux of
the matter is this: while the argument over who controls the state,
the people or the politicians , may be unanswered, the state continues
to operate as a discreet unit. Yet any decision the state may make is ,
in the final analysis , one embodying the essential quality of prophecy.
E’。r decisions , such as those of Weinberg writes of with regard to mani-
fest destiny , are commitments based upon expec~ed (or unexpected) reac-
tions. Certainly the conditions of some decisions cannot be fulfilled ,
as he illustrates in the case of 19th Century policy toward Latin Amer-
ica and the Carribean. Men often make prophetic .statements which never
come true.
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Before leaving Weinberg ’ s seminal study, it is necessary to dis-
cuss what he calls "the doctrine of inevitability. ,,60 In his discussion
he comes very close to a reckoning with the self-fulfilling prophecy:
The general validity of the doctrine or inevitability is of
course a question independent of the accuracy of specific predic-
tions. In raising this question of validity one can also leave
。utside the discussion the ~road philosophical question of deter-
minism itself. Determinism holds merely that the will lies within
the chain of causality••• ·.Bu~ the expansionists went beyond de-
terminism to a 모으프 sequiter. It is , as was shown by their predic-
tions , the dogma that one can know the inevitable before it has
happened. This hmvever is the dogma of the metaphys'ician rather
than of the empirical scientist __ l편r underlinin웰 Even predic-
tions projecting the findings of 함융st observations must be of ten-
tative character••••. for ••• the difficulty of prediction
is greater in the sphere of phenomena which are dependent upon
so great a variety of conditions as is the behavior of human
groups.6l
He thus concludes: ’'The truth is that fundamental motives are too many ,
varied and conflicting to permit foreknowledge of the motive which will
..62
actuate the predominant group'~"
Taken at ~ace value this seems to be a somewhat telling argument
against Neo-sYnthecismin general, for it see~ to deny knowledge of a
cl.imate of opinion. But is it?
In fact it is not: for Weinberg was not aware in 1935 of several
factors which have since been derived from research in the behavioral
sciences. I am of course speaking of both the Thomas theorem and Mer-
ton ’ s self-fulfilling prophecy. But strangely, although he was writing
long before Merton, he c따1e very close to identifying the mechanism
of the self-fulfilling prophecy when, quoting ‘ Allendy, he wrote:
". .' .that once impressed upon the unconscious , ’1 ’ image-destin'e tend
activement경 sa r옳lisation’.，，63 The self-fulfilling prophecy despite
Weinberg ’ s contentions is not , however , a doctrine of inevitability.
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It is a behavioral concept which appears quite correct in .its assumptions.
To be a "doctrine of inevitability" Neo-synthecism, especially as
it concerns the self-fulfilling prophecy , would in part have to allow
that human events , if not dictated by reason , are at least interpreted
in its light. That is , events would follow I'_eallv 。ne upon the other.
In fact one of the traditional major historico-philosophical problems
64derives itself from the very question of 츠!rationality.-· Hitler ’s
"final solution to the Jewish Problem" can in no way, under present
moral canons , be considered rational in either the problem it poses or
its "solution." Dachau, Auschwitz , and Belsen-Belsen can, in one way ,
Only that we must come to grips with the pro~lem of irrationality.
Neo-synthecism, while not directly explaining the reasons for the
irrational in man (this must be left to psychology) does very important-
1y provide for its direct expression. As it is not a total explanation
of history, but rather an exp1anation~of a process in history , it can,
unlike other theorles , accept the direct role of the irrational. This
must not be construed in any way to meanthat irrationality is thereby
seen as a predominant historical force (although the possibility certain-
ly exists!) .or that Neo-synthecism is based purely upon such an assump-
tion. The full import of this will be discussed in the final section.
Weinberg is aware of this problem of the irrational when he discusses
motive. There is , however , a certain failure on his part , to recognize
the distinction between relating the future from the past , the past
from the present , and the future from the present , as they relate t。
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historical interpretation. This failure is indeed a crucial one. Wein-
berg acts as if he has subsumed all three modes of interpretation under
。ne heading. The'predicta꺼ility of events is , as Weinberg recognized ,
ultimately as difficult in the past as in the future. Both the present
and the past present the historian with certain quite similar problems.
The past , as well as the future , consists of largely unrelated and un-
discovered facts. From our vantage point in time , we like to think
that both are vastly different modes of the occasion. The' future , we
say is "unreadable" because it has not "arrived." The future is either
continually moving towards us and/or we toward it. The past on the
。ther hand is said to have ceased to exist. We tend to view the past
asι?void ofoption, while simultaneously considering the future preg-
nant with possibility. The more "distant" the past the 궐똥 relevant
it seems to become; the "nearer" the future the 믿으E료 relevant. While
Weinberg interprets various cross sections of American history as a
function of manifest destiny , he seems to deny the ability to derive
a prevailing climate of opinion. The 、~xpansionists ， he contends , ’vent
_.65beyond determinism to a non sequitur."-- They assumed the ability t。
predict the inevitable before it' happened, 1I ••• as was shown by their
..66predictions.""" Putting aside the specifics of their predictions for
a moment , however , one fact is clear: no matter what the particular
prediction made , the essential quality of their thought was expansion
and the extension of territory. As certain different conditions came
to bear in each case , predictions were either fulfilled , as in the case
of Texas and Oregon , or passed ‘, , α 。blivion ， as with Canada and Ireland.
Weinberg has stated that knowledge of the future , even from the vantage
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。 f the present looking into the past , must be of a "tentative character. 1I
Specifically , however , knowledge of the future , (or as Weinberg says ,
"the inevitable") is the , "dogma of themetaphysician. ’,67 He fails to
realize that if one 료cts as if he knows the fpture , or the inevitable ,
he will likely att홉mpt to mak~ h~s view com훌 to P홉훌홉 • 'l'hat is , h월 1셰ill
try to fulfill his own prophecy. Thus , despite the expansionist ’ s logic
being a 묘으므 sequitur it must have followed in their own minds. Thus ,
too , they must have shared a "climate of opinion ," logical or not. Al-
though the prediction of human behavior may be difficult , it does not ,
within limits , seem altogether impossible. Weinberg implicitly accepts ,
as we have seen in the body of his writing, a certain unity and conform-
ity of opinion. If he did not , the concept of expansionism would be
meaningless. His conclusion that "fundamental motives" are too varied
and conflicting to predict predominant actuating motives for differing
groups , seems , therefore , "too hard and fast in its judgment.
Futther , Weinberg writes concerning motive interpretation:
••• even ability to foretell the victorious motive would not over-
come the difficulty offered by another fact... r·t is that the
same motive , in accordance with varying interpretations of an ~~­
sue , impelled different individuals- in opposite directions ..•• 68
Yet , if his judgment is correct then his analysis of manifest destiny
is' only a variety of speculative history. For the historian , from his
vantage point in the future , presumes to know at least some of the pre-
dominating motives of an event. If this is true , the historian can
know neither the future n으! the past; Weinberg would not , however , seem
to agree to this. For although the subject matter of history lies in
the past , the historian must ultimately realize that it can never exist
outside of the context of the present and the future.
CHAPTER IV
MYTH, HISTORY , AND THE :F’UI'URE
In discussing myth and history it must not be assumed that any
new data will be provided or derived as it relates directly to the con-
cept of myth itself. Myth as it is used here refers to , )’an ill-
fO l;Ulded belief held uncritically especially by an interested group." 1
In this context the definition becomes not simply a fanciful story of
past events and their relation to the formation of man and his world,
but also , in the context ofNeo-synthecism, an explanation of why cer-
tain historical events come to pass. Behind myth we will see , ‘ as this
analysis progresses , its intimate connection with the self-fulfilling
prophecy. The relationship betweenthe two provides a new tool for
understanding what has happened , and what is happening , in history.
In this regard Charles L. Sanford, in The Quest for ParadiseJ has not
neglected the import of myth as a causative factor in the unfolding of
history. He says for instance, concerning the role of the myth of
the Garden of Eden , "It would be difficult to exaggerate the extent
1 to which such mythology has contributed to the dynamism of history. ’,2
Sanford contends in fact , that the Christian Edenic myth , and its many
variations , has been the most powerful and dynamic force in American
history: " •••myth also contributes to historical change , for people
try to behave in conformity to myth pictures which portray , as Ernst
Cassire says , a dramatic world -- ’ the world of actions , of forces , of
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conflicting powers. ’ History moves , if it moves at all , in the-·mass ,
and mass psychology is peculiarily dependent on myth. ,,3 Here Sanford
is speaking of exactly the things which are the subject of this essay:
the self-fulfilling prophecy and behavioral 능cience as they relate t。
history and historical process.
Sanford ’ s analysis of the role of the edenic myth is , thus , a
detailed study of the manner in which it has moved through time and
space from its origin into the stream of the American life style. He
demonstrates , by whathe calls the "Journey Pattern of Modern History,"
how the vision of a heavenly paradise was transformed into an idea of
4an earthly view of the future.~ With the discovery of the New World
the medieval mind was finally opened to the possibilities of the ful-
fillment of the image of a worldly paradis·e which lay some'to1here in the
West. Columbus , for ex월nple， apparently felt that·the Biblical in-
junction to proclaim the gospel to the ends of the earth would , in
conjunction with the discovery of a "Ne'tY' World’I to the West , fulfill
5
the prophecy of Christ ‘s second coming.- Vespucci too , "... felt the
lure of paradise in the trade 'tY'inds off South America. 1I6 Thus , at
least part of the impetus for exploring and settling the New World
lay ‘ in the idea of an image of paradise on earth. But beyond this
urge to locate earthly paradise in the West lay other considerations
for exploration. The English , for example , considered themselves , II.
divinely appointed to establish themselves in the promised lands of
...7
the New World!'" F’ollowing the sun in its westward course the Puri-
tans as representatives of just such a "divine appointment ," ’r •••be-
lieved on 삼le whole, that they were the chosen instruments to set up a
~
..‘
city on the hill ’ as an example of the true Reformation to Europe
and the rest of the world. In this mission they regarded themselves
as the heirs of all history , curiously unappreciated by Englishmen at
8home , for whose salvation they prayed."'" It is this self-characteriza-
tion of themselves as the 1Iheirs of all history" that makes Americans
regard their civilization and culture as a chosen one. The United
States , Sanford contends , embodies more than any other nation, an at-
tempt to realize a perfect Protestant reformation in an earthly para-
dise. 9 It is this spirit of Protestantism which has come to predomi~
nantly characterize Americans: "Protestants were assuredly not people
to whom things happened, but· people who made things happen, and they
tried to make them happen according to a divine plan operative in his-
.. 10tory." -~ This regard for the working of his.torical forces , plus a
much vaunted spirit of individualism based in material wealth , accounts
for much of the success which Americans have had in turning history
(until of late) to their own purposes. In other words , Americans have
te~ded to define and shape their own~future as they saw it. Sanford
remarks , quite significantly, that as regards the early period of the
Continent ’s settling, the probability is that , "...historians have un-
derestimated seriously the extent to which millenial fervor molded the
motives of colonists , gave them their objectives , and controlled their
11
conduct."-- A~erica， Sanford seems to contend, was born with a spirit
。 f literal self-determination, yet divinely appointed and to some eχtent
determined!. The colonists held little doubt that America was to be the
12
site of the second coming.-- But before Christ returned , the earth
was to be paradisically transformed , "...as an outward symbol
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。f 담던 inward state. u13 The "race" for e꽤ire which continued until
the late 19th century between the New World and the Old ultimately be-
came one of propagating the gospel , converting the heathen, and as-
signing paradise to earth so as to insure i다 each nation the right t。
14
call itself "chosen. I1 -· Weinberg , as we have seen in the previous sec-
tion , discusses the proseletyzing spirit of the Amertcan pioneer: he
was to be a missionary of Christianity, economics , and freedom. The
primary functions of Weinberg ’ s pioneer become in part, for Sanford,
aspects of a broader international spirit. The Spanish and English,
for instance , were as interested a~ the Americans in extending their
concepts of religion and government to the New World. lS But for Amer- -
icans in particular, ’ ~issionary work on the American frontier con-
tributed greatly to what was tobecome an American superiority complex;
it gave divine sanction to the nineteenth century theme of Manifest
Destiny; and it helped to make Americans great proselytizers allover
..16the ","orld of the American Way of Life."
From the beginning down to th~ present the emphasis in the United
States has been that Americans are a chosen people who , "...were to
..17usher ill the final stage of history."·' American imperialism in the
form of manifest destiny, along with the later 20th century emphasis on
political-military isolation, were both the result of a certain spirit-
ua1 longing. The former was bornof optimism and the latter from the
18disappointments of political realities.
Sanford ’ s myth picture and its role extends through all pha틀es
of American industrial , political , cultural, and intellectual life.
The myth of the garden seems on the surface, however , missing in the
late 19th and early 20th centuries. On the contrary, however , the myth
~-~ ι
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continues , albeit in somewhat altered form. The role of the myth has
become one of a'perva~ive expectation of reform and progress:
As a r월ult of th응j。venant promise, Americans c。llectiveIy
have 1.5:2뾰 to tak으 J for granted a rich inheritance of inward
and outward life 혹nd have grown accustomed to making extrava-
gant d밑nands upon a radiant future. This Edenic promise that
made them inveterate reformers , instruments of optimistic fa~
talism~~s well as victims of their own impatience and frustra-
tions .~l9
Thrust into a world position of prominence , Americans have at-
tempted to bridge the gap of what had become isolationism to interna-
tiona1ism by calling forth her traditional role as moral reformer in a
20
world of sin. Sanford characterizes this as , ’'the policy of messianic
,,21intervention."....... The policy thereby generated, of reading world poli- •
tics as a "gigantic conspiracy of satanic forces arrayed against the
..22
children of God,"-- has led America into £.rustration and disappoint-
mente Its failuretobe consistently victorious , to gain support and
sympathy , .has led, Sanford concludes , to a call for moral regeneration
at the expense of keeping touch with reality. What may now be finally
happening is that Americans are c~ing to realize that they may have
23been dispossessed from Eden.
Sanford ’ s interpretation rests on the dynamic role of myth in
historical causation. Thus he displays the manner by which a nation
has tried, and in many instances succeeded, in calling an image of the
future into reality. The myth he speaks of is not , in the final analy-
sis , really myth as such; it is simply a vie~ of the future , as any
such myth must be. What Sanford succeeds in doing, how~ver ， is to show
how myths must , in the face of the real world, come to terms with the
possible and with other myth pictures. The traditional American vie찌
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of moral regeneration and spiritual re-birth out of a "European hell"
must finally come to grips with the explosive awakening of a world of
"under-developed" nations , each with their own view of what the future
must hold. The problem Sanford implicitly raises is one of priorities:
which view of the future is to take precedence over another; the Amer-
ican ’s or the under-developed nations ’ . This in turn raises a further
problem: is it possible for one nation ’ s view of the futureto predom-
inate over all other nations particular pictures? Weinberg partially
answered this question in the negative. But Sanford feels it neces-
sary for 파nericans to review their view in terms of the world we must
live in and with. Neither writer , however , really comes to close grips
with the problem. Perhaps the most specific approach to this problem
has been made by Robert L. Heilbroner in The Future as Historγ.
Heilbroner displays , with rare perspicasity , how Americans have
tended to look upon the future as history. In other 'tvords how, " ...we
have approached the future with the sustaining beliefs of a philosophy
。f optimism. That is , we have always conceived of the future in terms
of its benignity, its malleability, its compatability with our hopes
24
and desires. ’,-. This philosophy of optimism is , "at bottom, ...an
historic attitude toward the future -- an attitude based on the tacit
premise that the future will accommodate the striving we bring to
__ 25
it ••• " Once again then, we encounter the idea that man is able t。
project his concept of the future into reality. Heilbroner finds rea-
son to believe that the day of such conceptual realization has , as far
as national and international. relations , passed. The past realization
of our national goals , both internal and external , he contends , relied
4 i..'-'
。n the United States ’sinsulated position in a world of contending and
conflicting ideologies. Therein lay the secret of America ’ s success
in effecting the transferral of its ideals into reality. In the
contemporary world , however , the insul갑강ion Qf physical and ideologi-
cal barriershas been stripped away , projecting America directly int。
the course of world events. In this uninsulated position the United
States finds its own view of the future in direct competition with
other views. The rising expectations of the "Third World" countries
have , as a result of our conspicuous display of wealth , been increased
immeasurably. But the effort to realize these expectations has met with
almost universal disappointment. Most nations have neither the inher-
ent wealth nor the time to develop what wealth they may posses , nor
the relative freedom from the hegemony of ~n international system of cor-
porate organization now personified in the United States. The process
whereby a particular economic view of the future can be realized has
traditionally been for Americans one based upon "capitalism" and "in-
dividualism". The basic conflict which faces America is between the
eχtension of its economic system, based on wealth and time , on re1a-
tive freedom from international exploitation (which existed in the early
history of the United States) , and the realities of a world which has
neither. The failure to realize that other countries do not have the
inherent economic background to develop politically along United States
style democratic lines leaves America running against ideological time
and tide. Heilbroner see·s the world ’s future tied in with direct na-
tional planning, what we tend 'to call socialism. Although Heilbroner
does not see the future as inevitably tending in one direction, he
does see certain lines of development running counter to traditional
26
American standards.-- Thus , the under-developed nations will tend
more toward p1anned ec。n?my and less t。 free narket enterprise; t。。， as
expectations grow and the realization that many of those same expecta-
tions cannot be quickly met , national frustration is likely to set in.
This frustration will likely , as is in somecases now true, be vented
27 ’
and directed against America.-· This means also that America will be
faced with national frustration as other nations display motives and
policies which seemingly run counter to our own. (After the I ’fall"
of China in 1949 this is exactly what happened. The reaction of the
’'McCarthyites" was the personification of just" such a national frus-
tration.) What this becomes is nothing less than a clash of national
prophecy: will the American view of the future prevail or will another
view succeed against it? It has been noted earlier that when two or
more views of the future come in conflict , the one which shares the
general climate of opinion will likely prevail. Heilbroner seems t。
concur when he says: ’'As a capital~st nation we are no longer riding
28
with the global tides of economic revolution, but against them. ’I
,,29While Heilbroner sees , "the forces of history closing in"" .7 on
America, he does not fall prey to a feeling of inevitability. For
while the options open to America may have become more restricted ,
they have by no means disappeared. He says explicitly that , " ... there
are no fixed limits tO'what is historically p~ssible. Rather , differ-
ent organizations of society define for themselves and the limits
。f what is and what is not within reach of conscious history-making
30
choice. If ... .., Heilbroner appears to believe , with i.n limits , the basic
validity of the self-fulfilling prophecy. He also suggests another
42
facet of the role of myth in historical forces beyond that of which
Sanford writes.
In an article entitled "Myth in the East-West Conflict ,..3l John
H. Kautsky raises the direct problem of the rple of myth in shaping
and directing national policy both here and abroad. In this article ,
which incidentally first led me to the concept of the self-fulfilling
prophecy in history, Kautsky discusses the various labels which lead
to inappropriate symbol transference and usage. "Socialist ," for ex-
하np1e， is , as Kautsky notes , hardly an appropriate term for an African
leader who , "...represents intellectuals aiming at rapid industria1iza-
tionrather than workers aiming at improving their position in an a1-
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ready industrialized society••• " .... - The question of labels , while not
entirely neglected by Heilbroner , is somewhat glossed over. Kautsky
on the other hand gives it the needed emphasis. Basing his concept
of myth on George Sorel ’s definition of myths , as "a complex of remote
33goals , tense moral moods and expectations of apolyptic success ,"
Kautsky demonstrates how such concepts as Marχism， Communism, American
democracy , etc. , are all based on industrialized societies whose method
for goal attainment is often irrelevant to the goals of an aspiring
underdeveloped country. lIThus ," writes Kautsky, ’ ~estern ideologies ,
which in their own environment can have at least some realistic progra-
matic content , become myths in the Sorelian sense in their new under-
1134developed environment."--"'T The real problem is that having become at-
tached to the particular meanings of such concepts as "democracy" and
"socialism" in the context of their own particular situatiQn, people
continue to react to new uses of the terms in old contexts. Revolu-
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tionary movements which couch their purpose in terms such as
"democracy" against "tyranny" often at first find ample Western sup-
port albeit their true nature is lost on the Western political mind.
Cuba is perhaps the best representative of th~s type.
Kautsky goes on to describe how Soviet Marxism is , in its turn,
ultimately a creation of myth. He says , concerning this characteriza-
tion,
What needs to be stressed••• is ••• that the Marxian categories ,
which are clearly misapplied to the Bolsheviks' actions as ex-
planatory or descriptive concepts , became myths that have af-
fected behavior. The Communists ’ broad program of industrial-
ization as actually followed , especially by Stalin, would quite
probably have been followed by other modernizing re~Qlutionary
intellectuals even if they had never heard of Marx. 35
Similarly , Kautsky examines the effects of myth in foreign rela-
tions between the United States and the Soviet Union.
Pointing to the realization on Lenin's part that the Soviet revo-
1ution of 1917 did not , as Marx said it would, take place in an indus-
trial nation , Kautsky traces the genesis of fear andmutual distrust
built up between the United States a~d the Soviet Union over the past
3650 years.-- Much of this fear , Kautsky concludes , "...has been due to
the mistaken belief on both sides , that it was a revolution appropriate
to an advanced country , a revolution of a proletariat against capital-
,37ism. ’ The myth of world c。따nunist revolution still of course generates
fear among the political leaders of the "West ," as does fear of capital-
ist-imperialism among those of the "East." Gl;owing economic power has
led the Soviet Union to "play down" this latter aspect , so prominent in
its foreign policy when it was weak. (Due in part, also , to the Amer-
ican intervention in the Russian civil war of 19l9-l920~) Now that the
~+5
Soviet Union has become strong militarily as well as industrially it can
rely on the more esoteric forms in the fight against "Imperialism."
As Kautsky notes: lithe realization of World Corrnnunism has been post-
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poned to the dim future."
Kautsky goes on to discuss the implications of symbols as instru-
ments of reassurance and as self-perpetuating quantiti~s. What is
important here, hQwever , and what Kautsky does not discuss directly,
is how myth may ultimately cause war. The pattern is actually a fairly
simple one: because of the myths perpetuated by both the United States '~
‘ and the Soviet Union, a mutual mist~ust has arisen. (The actual rea-
sons behind the myths do not matter , -only the result.) Each arms in
fear of the other ’s intentions. Each sees the other ’s growing mili-
tary might , and each grows more apprehensiv~. As the armaments grow,
suspicion that the other wants war and intends to wage it , grows accord-
ingly. Finally each eχpeets war as inevitable, causing it to , of course,
finally break into the open. That the United States and the Soviet
Union operate on ~uch an assumption ~s clearly the case. The so-called
military-industrial complex which C. Wright Mills described so percep-
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tively in The Power Elite is the direct result of just such a mili-
tary-po1itical myth picture. Perhaps no better illustration could be
made to point out the relevancy of the self-fulfilling prophecy in
historical-political- situations. Ultimately, such prophecy coming t。
fulfillment could mean the end, not only of ciγilization， but of man
and even of all life itself. Although the future of man is doubtless
important , the understanding of what makes man act in history is , in
the immediate present, far more r휩levant to civilization. The future
in one sense depends not on 뾰뾰 man may do , but what motivates him
and 브으꽁 it motivates him. If we do not learn to fully comprehend the
mechanism of historical activity we may never live to contemplate what
a lack of understanding may mean.
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CHAPTER V
IMPLICATIONS
History , we are told , is what has happened. No one it seems , how-
ever , ever makes it quite clear how the relating of this is to be done.
On the one hand there are Relativistic , Idealistic , Heroic , Dialectic ,
Materialistic , Eschatological, Chiliastic , Positivistic and like
theories of eχplanation. On the other there is , for instance, the
sceptic denying our ability to know anything about our past , or the
"ahistoric" individual simply dismissing it all as irrelevant in any
case. While an "ahistoric" attitude has ~ certain sinψlicity which
is appealing it does not seem to satisfy intellectual curiousity (if
such can ever be possible). But historians are , if not driven to seek
cause in history , fascinated by the prospects such a possibility car-
ries. History is , at base, probably relevant to man because he is
searching for patterns in the past which will guarantee hisfuture.
George Santayana has said, in a famous quotation, that he who does
not study history is doomed to repeat it. In so far as man believes
such a statement he believes in progress. When a problem is no longer
relevant man will no longer l~ok to the past for information conceπling
its elimination~ When a belief in progress ~s no longer relevant ,
manwill , in all likelihood , no longer look to history for direction.
While Heilbroner may feel that the very concept of progress is somehow
doomed to decline in importance and perhaps wither away altogether ,
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it is likely that history will continue to maintain a certain relevance
for man. Heilbroner has said that a philosophy of optimism requires a
certain attitude which may be called almost exclusively American. l The
prospect arises that only in a progress-oriented society can Neo-syn-
thecism be fully and completely operative. If society does advance
through history by conscious decisions , then a static culture would
seemingly not be as prone to make decisions about the particular shape
of things to come. Such a society would perhaps be content to "rest
upon its laurels ," and not consciously choose truly specific courses
。f action. In the long run , a nation ’ s political fortunes probably
depend upon great national wealth and an explosive surge of creative
2
and innovative talent to put such wealth to use.- Alone , neither
would seem to be sufficient. America , almost uniquely among modern
nations , has been blessed with both to the extent that it has exper-
ienced an incredible technological "jump" unsurpassed in all past time.
The material wealth of the United States has , in part , made it possible
for Americans to believe in a bountiful and beneficent future. But
such hope is based for the most part on a beneficent past. There is
thus the concept of progress as an interdependency between the Ureality';’
of what has happened and what the future holds'as possibilities. If
the past is held as relevant , so will be the future.
Today , however , historical interpretation, if not history itself ,
has become increasingly complex. Simplistic notions of progress will
no longer suffice. To understand what has happened in history, his-
torians of the future will be faced with accepting the behavioral sci-
ences as a tool for more complete comprehension. Perhaps the most
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frustrating mistake historians can make is to view such a complex
creature as man as if he were a simple , easily definable and recog-
nizable quantity. 'History, if it is anything is not simply a record
。f what has happened, but rather what has happened to 핀르프. As man 、 is
incredibly compleχ， so , too , history is simiiarly complex. The other
primary mistake of the historian is to approach history as if it were
simply a recording of the events which have transpiredamong men; not
as if it were an intricate, delicately balanced network of human action
and interaction, based on the vagaries of emotion and the web of the
intellect. Most historians probably realize the role of interpreta-
tion. What many neglect is an adequate understanding of just what it
is they are interpreting: man. To attempt the writing of history in
such circumstance is not unlike trying to predict the path of a ballis-
tic missile without knowing.how such a missile works , or what it is
for. It can be done , but of what relevance is it if one does not know
what such a missile is meant to do? It is a case of too little too late.
Few will probablydeny the impqrtant role of the behavioral sci-
ences as an historical tool in some limited degree. But we must ask,
what can the behavioral sciences tell us of the outcome of history? Can
we really, after all, control it directly? These' are the truly crucial
questions that must be answered; and the answers are not easy ones.
In reality the behavioral sciences can probably , by themselves ,
tell us nothing of the outcome of history. They can tell us something
。f the mechanisms ‘ by which history takes place. The understanding of
mechanisms can in turn lead us to , if not a general picture of the out-
come of history, then perhaps more short run and specialized views.
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An analogy (dangerous as this form of reasoning may be) may help t。
illustrate this statement. Science knows that certain atomic and sub-
atomic particles behave in a certain way under certain conditions. The
ability to predict what a particle will· do under certain conditions a1-
lows scientists to predict wh당t the outcome of say, a chemical reaction,
will be. On the other hand this predictability is in reality a fairly
limited kind of activity. To this extent scientists cannot , for exam-
pIe, track a series of particles and make projectio~s for their fate
thro가~houtall .t·ime. Indeed, if this were possible scientists could
conceivably start from the present , tracing the paths of particles
back through time to their primordial beginnings , then project forward
into the future what 'i펴e fate of all matter will be. Thus they could
"read-out" a pre-progr없med pattern of the.universe , telling us what
will h강ppen and when. This would , of course, make everything inevitable.
Several minor difficulties stand in the way of this total comprehension
surpassing mere understanding. Scientists find themselves , for instance ,
unable to track both the position and velocity of a particle simu1tan-
eously. This is the famous "Heisenberg Indeterminancy princip1e. ,,3
At the same time the sheer gargantuan size of such a projection (if it
were possible to do) staggers the intellect. Consider the programming
involved in such a project. With one I.B.M. card for each particle and
for each projected path, the number of cards would exceed the total
number of particles'in the known universe! If cross sa때ling， that is
statistical sampling, were attempted, the number of possibilities would
make such a sample utterly me~ningless. The upshot of all this digres-
sion is that while predictability is applicable in science, it is ap·
plicable only over an exceedingly limited range.
Similarly , behavioral science , at best in its infancy , can make
only the mostmodest kinds of predictions concerning human behavior.
Nonetheless , the self-fulfilling prophecy , as representative of the
behavioral approach, can make modest historical prediction realizable.
More than anything , Neo-synthecism makes it possible to understand
history as a direct function of human behavior. It shows how men react
to the subjective features of a situation as if they were objective.
Thus it gives the historian a more complete understanding of the irra-
tional in history. And in one sense , irrationality is to history what
the indeterminancy principle is to physics. By eXhibiting the process
whereby men concretize the irrational we take into account not so much
the psychology of the act as the direct manifestation. In this the
historian is much like the scientist: as the latter can track only
either the position, 으~ measure the velocity of a particle, so the
historian-behavioral scientist can interpret either the act of irra-
tionality or the psychology of the act. But ultimately , the hidden
reasons that drive a man to act can only be partially known. We can-
not go back into time to directly psychoanalyze an historical figure
whQ has ~cted irrationally; we can only show how he acts in terms of
his reasoning, faulty as it may be. In this respect , however , the
historian has a slight edge over the scientist for the historian has
a direct , albeit piecemeal, picture of what has happened. To the ex-
tent he can "see" what has happened he can track simultaneously both
the "position" and "velocity" of an historical figure. He can thus
directly view irrationality and rationality concretizing itself. He
has a view from the future which allows him to see how things will turn
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。ute While far from complete , the historian can interpret the past in
a much more comprehensive manner than can a physicist attempting t。
account for the genealogy of a particle. It is , however , in the opera-
tions involving the future , that the historian loses interpretive ground
to the physicist. F’。r the latter can make predictions based on what
appear to be the highly rational workings of nature , using his own
l ’present" as ~ stable base, while the former is forced to deal with
the more obviously irrational forces of man's intel1~ct，、 with little
apparent bases for understanding. In other words , there is a fine
line dividing our understanding of the concrete and relatively obvious
pa$t human event from thξ not so obvious sub-atoli'\ic ~\，.，힘'\t • 13 \l t '(,TH:h
regard to the future the reverse becomes true , and man becomes thε
supposedly totally uru<no\vu factor. At present, particle physics can-
not help man understand the minute interactions and relations which
make him function but , perhaps , the future of 당 cienee holds out this
possibility. Where science has made contemporary strides more directly
applicable is , as we have seen, in behavioral science.
Can we then come to directly control the future and dictate the
。utcome? America in the Sixties is a troubled land, troubled by racial
conflict , by political assassinations and by foreign difficulties ,
among other things. One thing has become clear in contemporary Ameri-
can history: we are desperately trying to come to grips with the pos-
sibi1ities of our future. America can probably go in many directions ,
4but it can no longer afford to simply "drift."'" Its people , its cit-
ies , its enemies. will not allow the United States to pursue a course
dictated by non-involvement. Most Americans are fully aware of the
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implications of a policy , both external and internal , which does.. not
direct. Thenew politics of Left , Center, and Right reflect a def-
inite sense of direction for good or for evil. America then, is try-
~ng to direct it~ mm history. (Some critics ‘ of the American scene
would probably go as far as to say that we ;:.:;:e trying to direct the
history of everyone!)
The United States , as well as much· of the rest of the world, has
learned some unique and increasingly important lessons over the past
t~ree decades. The implications of what we have learned are fraught
with promise and incredible disaster for man ln general. One of these
important lessons is this: while it may be correct as President Eisen-
5hower said, that men ’ s hearts cannot be legislated to , it is not only
r야•』.꽤a뿔s.m따4」n--i라않1,‘σ。.mca1LPV‘•b랴’nil‘.-V4,와’l‘‘--1L마ku·ye--‘·뼈,mDι
tain forms of behaVior , certain other "negative’I aspects of behavior
can be altered. .Thus while men may feel no differently in their hearts ,
their actions can be suited to purposes beyond them. Every society
implicitly recognizes this fact when~it makes its laws. What this comes
down to is but another form of the self-fulfilling prophecy.A society
can thus concretize a legal fiction. This in turn can ultimately alter
and shape beliefs. 0마 society is consciously doing just this in rela-
tion to the contemporary racial situation. It is trying to shape and
direct how, in a fairly precise way , America will look in the future.
The Civil Rights Acts of 1866 , 1957, 1960, and.1964, are all attempts
to.do just this. We are then, in the very process ofdefining our fu-
ture as'we would will it. Martin Luther King, Jr. in 1962 , demonstrated
and outlined just what is currently taking place in America and how it
is happening:
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There are always those who will argue that legislation , court
orders and executive decrees from the Federal 낀Jvernment are in-
, effective because they cannot legislate morals. But while it
may be true that morality cannot be legislated , behavior can be
regulated. The law may not change the heart -- but it can re-
strain the heartless. ‘ It will take education and religion t。
change bad internal attitudes -- but legislation and court
orders can control their external effects. Federal court de-
crees have , for example , altered transportation patterns and
changed social mores -- so that the habits , if not the heart갑’
of people 르E르 being altered every day by Federal action. And
these major social changes have a cumulative force conditioning
other segments of life. o
By legislating 효으 men, governments attempt to fulfill not only a proph-
ecy of future stability but the shape of society in general , according
to certain preconceived ideas. No society can exist without a certain
amount of planning. This process faces several problems , however , deal- •
ing directly with the self-fulfilling prophecy. First , as Merton points
out:
an extensive and as yet imperfeε쉰 ly identified type of
social science prediction is confron亡ed with a paradox: if it
is made public , the prediction becomes seemingly invalidated
and if it is not made public it is g~nerally regarded as post-
diction. It is considered knowledge after the fact.7
As social scientists have come to recognize, a prediction, or prophecy,
can invalidate itself once the terms come to be fully recognized. Mer-
ton illustrates this by pointing , outthat a
• government economist ’ s distant forecase of an oversup-
ply of wheat may possibly lead individual producers of wheat t。
so cu~tail their planned production as to invalidate the fore-
cast. U
Thus , too , as the intent of civil rights legislation comes to be gener-
ally known , it can be invalidated by direct resistance, as in the case
。 f militants of either race. This kind of process is called the "self-
9destroying belief" by Merton.' It points up the problem of defining
and identifying conscious and unconscious prophecy within society. By
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.directly identifying andexhibiting such beliefs the social scientist
and historian run the risk of negating their discoveries concerning the
future of a given society. This problem, however , is of relatively
little importance in view of the other major problem social prediction
implies. If , as C. Wright Mills contends there is a military , political,
and industrial elite which is shaping and guiding American policy here
10
and abroad，~~ the possibility for direct.social control by a relatively
few men certainly exists. Governmental legislation could be aimed at
direct population control by extremely subtle and sophisticated means.
Thus , a legislative effort could be made directing its attention at
unifying white and black in America not simply because it is "right,"
but because it splidifies the political control of the larger white
majority. While such activity could only be , subtly directed in America,
its , studied application in China, for example , is hardly subtle. It
would seem in the latter case that social stability was being maintained
in part by projecting a view of the future which sees a ’'jihad" , or "holy
war" , with either the United States 0;- the Soviet Union as possible,
if not inevitable. The point is that a view of the future can have
very negative implications for control as well as general outcome. The
elements of planning for the future , so necessary for society, can be
twisted to uses beyond the individual citizen to the advantage of a
single group or political figure. George Orwell ’s 설옆 is the perfect
picture of what a society can read into its fu~ure， horrifying as it
may be. Recognition of the problem can obvio\펴ly help to allay the p。야s-
sibilities of such a prospect by realizing new socially beneficent
and sound policy. Neo-synthecism then, can help as a tool for the
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‘ interpretation of the historical past and the probable historical
future; to create and most importantly discover and analyze those
functionswhich society takes for granted -- those functions which
society implicitly recognizes but often does ~ot speak αf consciously.
Neo-synthecism is more than a way of looking at history -- ulti-
mately it is a way of describing all the interlocking activities of
man ,. It is thus , possible to look upon it as an activity transcending
。ne or two disciplines for an interdisciplinary approach to the ultimate
goal of all human activity: the understanding of man and his relation
to the universe. Neo-synthecism while not ans 'tvering the "why" of things
in ‘ a metaphysical manner , can certainly aim at an explanation in terms
of the physical reality of human nature. I do not mean to denigrate
the role of the spiritual in the explanation of human events; this must ,
however , take its place in the non-empirical side of human affairs. It
must , therefore , be taken into account , but not as a total explanation.
It is but one facet of human activity and, like the irrational , has its
own reasons , and must , therefore , be~accounted for.
Each man finds his own time the most difficult , the most dangerous ,
and the most intriguing in history. The perspectives so necessary to a
master of oneself and ones times and environment are not easily'won by
any generation. Some succeed, others fail miserably. Each genera-
tion tries its best to cope with the world as it finds it. No genera-
tion has ever made the world they inherited; each generation changes
the world it finds itself swept into. Events can probably control
men -- but men can, if they will but try , control events. History ,
if it teaches us anything teaches us this fact. There is a point man
must come to in dealing with history and 칩1e cur:-ents of contemporary
events when he will·have to take responsibility for his activity. Ir-
rationality can be no excuse for the course of events~ for man is re-
sponsible for that very irrationality. We have. seen ,· in a limited way ,
the manner in which historians and social scientists have come to rea-
lize the proper role of man in history. Some , the behavioral scientists
for example , exhibit this role explicitly. Historians utilize this gen-
eralization, but often unwittingly.
Americans are generally 낀 aid to be committed to the idea of pro-
gress and individualism. What they really have been committed to is
action in the pursuit.of a particular future. The time has come for a
fuller understanding of the process whereby men make history come t。
pass. It will b앙 a difficult endeavor , for in observing and recording
we may alter the outcome we expect. Too , we must take into considera-
tion the nature of change itself.· The강e are obviously factors we shall
never be able to take into account. Who would have accepted one-hundred
years ago the !.렬죠 possibilities of a 썩yage around the moon? Even now
the voyages being made into space take on an almost unreal quality. But
while it is impossible to account for specific change it is not impos-
sible to be prepared for it. In terms of the historical process , both
past and future , the Neo-synthetic theory allows for non-absolute con-
tinuity , while providing "relative" and conditional continuity. What
this means is that the unexpected need not destroy the efficacy of Neo-
synthecism. r’。r instance, the past seems static and unchanging to the
observer looking "back." Occasionally, however , this static condition
reveals a certain unexpected dynamism when a new ’'fact" comes to light
and changes an entire historical perspective.
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Charles A. Beard ’ s An Economic I Thterpretation of the Constitution
11is a case in point. -- Suddenly new vistas open up and the past somehow
changes. While some people are upset , most exhibit a certain curiousity.
But when an expected future event , such as was the case with democracy
in Cuba , does not come to pass most people are either very upset or at
least must change some of their plans. Unfulfilled eχpectations can be
very disquieting. If we do succeed in making predictions , or at very
least , discovering implicit prophecy within society~ its non-fulfillment
would seem to destroy the predictive capabilities of Neo-synthecism. But
if we keep in mind the limits and ranges of our activities in the same
manner as a nuclear physicist does , we can allow for sudden and dramatic
change. Such change need not upset the historian or behavioral scien-
t~st ， but rather serve to remind him that ~ turn in the road of time
is indicated and must be accounted for. As the title of this essay
suggests , it is necessary for the historian to not only look back upon
the past from the perspective of the moment , but to also "look back" from
the future , in terms of its possibi~ities， to discover the real meaning
of the present. One must have , in this sense, a "view from the future."
History is a discipline that must be approached delicately and pe~cept-
ively , for so much of it is interpretive. And , as Paul Ricoeur·has
said , "If we want to be instructed by events , then we must not be in
a hurry to solve them."12
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APPENDIX
There are some relatively obvious connections that can be made
between the self-fulfilling prophecy , revolutionary Marxism and revolu-
tionaries in general. As has been noted, every true revolutionary
utilizes the self-fulfilling prophecy. Revolutionary Marxism, in its
19th century orientation toward the evils of industrialism, called for
upheaval in those countries which were marked by a high degree of tech-
nological , that is industrial , advancement •. The standard· criticism
raised against tho~e so-called "Marxist revolutions" that did take
place (e.g. , Russia and China) is that nowhere has the ideology flour-
Iished where there was an advanced technological state.~ In one sense
this is a rather damning pronouncement concerning the true nature of
Marχism. On the other hand, it shows , once again, how an originally
fals~ definition of a situation evokes neW behavior; thus fulfilling
the terms of the originally false definition.
The Communist State is a definition of a political situation that
has never really come to pass. Yet the revolutionaries in preindustrial
China and Russia, initiated and carried through their respective revolu-
tions as if they were based upon the original Marxian economic and
political conditions. To강ay both Russia and China still continue
to define their world and social roles as Marxian. The peculiarly
false situations , which both derive their "Marxian'’ beginnings from
are really unimportant in-so-far as this essay is concerned. All
civilizations live on I ’selected fictions" which men call "ideals." That
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such "ideals" are in the main, ’'fictious" does not , however , make them
superfluous or \vithout value. Indeed , as Soviet and Chinese "Marxism"
makes apparent , such definitions , whether or not they are attained in
the ideal , are dynamic and emotion-filled mQdes. No one denies , cer-
tainly , that Marχism and Capitalism are "loaded" words , and if one in-
quires as to why they are "loaded" then he must come to grips vlith the
way men define themselves and their world. But this means more than
simply understanding a philosophy or philosophies. Ultimately it
means understanding how men approach their future with regard to the
world and themselves. For if a man cannot picture a philosophy , 'a
social world , or a , political structure as fully able of beingrealized
in the real world (and in some not too distant future) then he will
not act upon that vision. It is in the end, an almost too simple recog-
nition of what every human being does in his own daily life. Each of
us expects to live for a certain amount of time; and each of us to a
certain extent fills in that "projected time" with certain plans. Is
this not really making prophecy abo~t ourselves? We certainly have no
guarantee of the future , yet we all expect certain things. What the
revolutionary does is simply adopt to a more definitive view of the
future. The Marxists , as representative of the revolutionary, assumes
a surpassing mastery over fate because he claims to know the pattern
of history , and the inevitable. Everything he does will , as such,
be defined and delineated in terms of this assumption. Even when events
transpire differently the revolutionary Marxist will probably interpret
them as part of the process of the dynamics of history. Herein lies
his strength.· Chairman Mao Tse-tung of the Chinese Peoplε’ s Republic
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for example , apparently viewed many of the setbacks to the eventual
revolutionary victory of 1949 as almost necessary: as fulfilling the
2process of 、 the dialectic. Action and reaction then are defined by
the , manner in which an individual approaches the future. Things may ,
of course , "pile up" and simply make all definitions of a partiιular
future irrelevant. The revolutionary Marxist may finally encounter to。
much to cope with and be submerged in the currents of history. Men (as
in the case of Regis Debray and "Che" Guevara)3 who consider man master
of his own fate , may misread and misdirect the conduct and course of af-
fairs. Sometimes even a million men cannot move one idea.
Man , as a whole , is certainly aware of the role of political and
philosophical activity as a motivating factor in the affairs of nations
and individuals. tvhat may be lost on many is the role that expectations
(i.e. , prophecy) have in relation to motivation. Merleau Ponty, the
French I ’political" philosopher has said , "Ellel확 Politiq1.표jn ’ est pas
/
une chapitre d ’une histoire universelle deja ecrite. Elle est une'action
qui s ’ invente. ’.4 One might add , howeyer , that while there is no' lIhistoire
/ -
universelle deja ecrite" , there are "invented" pictures of possible
futures which as prophecy, tend , through the activity of men, to rea-
lize themselves. In other words , the only views of the future that
will come to pass as "already written" are those that man insures through
the acts of his own will; Marxist ’ s not excepted. "Les grands revolu-
tionnaires • • • ," writes Merleau Ponty, "savent bien que 1 ’histoire
/
universelle n'est pas ~ contempler , mais 'faire. • • ."
-'---•--•--•
